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This article explains the dynamics of the “path-breaking” evolution in the corporate 
governance of Russia’s big private businesses since Putin rose to power in 2000, based on 
the discursive institutionalism. For the goal, it pays attention to several political factors 
such as Putin’s state bureaucracy and tax reform, economic recovery, and newly rising 
coherent elite groups, which constructed statism. Due to these factors, the Russian state 
could be empowered in both ideational and material dimensions, and the power relations 
between the state and businesses also transformed significantly. Under the hegemonic 
domination of Putin’s statism, as a result, owner-managers began to reinterpret the 
problem of corporate governance and spontaneously accepted prominent foreign 
shareholders, though they were subject to supervision and constraint by the outside owners. 
These behaviors were caused more by political incentives of owner-managers than by 
economic interests, because the external owner would increase the costs of which the 
offensive state must pay in the instance of arbitrary threats to businesses. The existence of 
prominent external shareholders itself could protect the assets of oligarchs and legitimize 
their political statuses. In other words, changes in the interests and strategies of owner-
managers who collided with the empowered state, which “attacked” and confiscated big 
private businesses through nationalizing them, consequently brought about changes in 
corporate governance toward the “Anglo-Saxon model.”
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Introduction
This article aims to explain the dynamics of the “path-breaking” 
evolution that has taken place in the corporate governance of Russia’s big 
private businesses1 since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 2000. This paper 
focuses on the unique political economic contexts rather than limiting its 
view to economic efficiency in order to examine how conversion of big 
businesses was brought about. 
Since the mid-1990s when the shift in the political economic system was 
in full swing along with neoliberal reforms and privatization, big Russian 
businesses attracted attention. A research conducted in 2002 showed that 
eight oligarchs controlled 85 percent of the country’s top 64 businesses. 
According to Sakwa (2004: 190-191), the share of big businesses remained 
undiminished even during Putin’s term. Big businesses used to concentrate 
on speculative action of “virtual economy” to accumulate financial assets in 
the 1990s but switched their main business areas to “real economy” after 
2000. In addition, amendments to the laws concerning corporate governance 
have been made in favor of the “Anglo-Saxon shareholder-oriented model” 
(Rodionov and Skaletsky, 2002; Porshakov, 2004; Roberts, 2004). 
Big-scale product market regulations in Russia continue to be managed 
politically through patrimonial connections because the state is still the major 
coordinator of the national economy with extensive public ownership of 
assets. Nonetheless, since the later part of Putin’s first term, only large private 
businesses have shown a real shift toward the “Anglo-Saxon model” beyond 
the legal changes.2 In fact, individual “majority shareholder-managers” 
1 In regard to Russian big businesses, researchers use a variety of terms, including “financial 
industrial groups,” “financial-industrial businesses,” “oligarchs,” and “big businesses.” See Johnson 
(1997), Hoffman (2003), Sakwa (2004), and Hanson and Teague (2005). This article chooses to use 
the term “big businesses.”
2 While changes in corporate governance at the legal level started to progress at the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the first decade of the new millennium, actual changes at the firm level 
began around 2002-03. In other words, corporate governance of big private businesses had evolved 
toward the “Anglo-Saxon model” very slowly until 2002. According to UBS Warburg, however, 
indicators of “transparency” and “dilution protection” both rose by approximately 15% points by 
2003, although the “asset integrity” category rose by only 8% points. Furthermore, according to S&P, 
89% of the corporate information had already been made available through annual reports, websites 
and so on. Also, businesses started to open themselves to the public voluntarily, and since 2002, this 
trend has grown consistently. For more details, see Standard and Poor’s (2004). Since the 
introduction of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” in 2002, even U.S. companies have not had an easy time 
making IPOs on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Nevertheless, Vimpelcom, Rostelecom, 
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(owner-managers) have few incentives to make Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
or sell stakes to others or to voluntarily change corporate governance to the 
“Anglo-Saxon model” in countries like Russia where owner-managers are still 
thriving and the state-controlled range remains very wide. Rather, the 
corporate governance type in big businesses had been more closely related to 
the “German model” right after the post-Soviet reform. Then, what caused 
the “new phenomena,” a patterned conversion in the corporate governance of 
some big private businesses in Russia during this period? 
In an ex-communist country, the institutional and ideational contexts 
such as property rights influenced by the relation between the state and 
businesses are quite different from those of countries in which market 
systems have gone through a long process of development (Stiglitz, 2002: 
136-142). Under such conditions where a unique relationship exists between 
the state and businesses, certain political factors influenced the relations in 
line with the rise of Putin. The imbalance of power between the state and 
businesses increased substantially and the political economic contexts 
surrounding corporate governance also changed tremendously in Russia. 
Thus, when considering the evolution of corporate governance of Russia’s big 
private businesses, it is necessary to take into consideration interactions 
between the relevant actors and each actor’s specific goals and incentive 
mechanisms that are determined in accordance with the political economic 
contexts. Therefore, this article intends to look into the causes of the 
evolution of corporate governance based on the judgment that the trend of 
adopting the “Anglo-Saxon model” cannot be explained properly solely 
through the functionalist approach. Instead, this paper attempts to provide an 
alternative political analysis of the conversion of corporate governance by 
criticizing existing approaches that consider economic interests or efficiency 
and future profitability as the main independent variable. 
Wimm-Bill-Dann and MTS, etc., have all been traded on the NYSE from before 2004 to the present. 
In addition, Lukoil, Sibneft and Norilsk Nickel among others had already been listed on the trustable 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). Since 2004, many firms including Sistema, etc., have also been 
permitted to penetrate the LSE (Heinrich, 2005; Belyankina, 2006: 2; Markus, 2008: 79-82). 
Furthermore, according to the recent annual financial reports of big Russian businesses in the main 
industrial sectors and their subsidiaries, at least the private leading firms of respective sectors have 
fulfilled the main requisites for advanced corporate governance since the middle of the first decade 
of the new millennium. As a typical case, Lukoil and TNK-BP have already drawn up a “consolidated 
financial statement” in the oil sector based on the U.S. GAAP in accordance with international 
accounting standards. The cases of Wimm-Bill-Dann in the agricultural and food sector, 
Vimpelcom in the telecommunication sector, and Norilsk Nickel in the metal sector are all alike. As 
for these, see Wimm-Bill-Dann (2003), Lukoil (2006: 70-75), TNK-BP Holdings (2006: 22-26), and 
Vimpelcom (2006: 26-34).
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The following section examines and criticizes existing theoretical 
approaches that explain changes in corporate governance, provides an 
alternative theoretical view called discursive institutionalism, and elaborates 
on the main hypothesis of this article. The third section examines the 
political factors that brought about the metamorphosis of Russia’s state 
during Putin’s term of office. The fourth section analyzes how the evolution 
of corporate governance of big businesses came about, noting the political 
dynamics of the changed interactions in the reversed power relation between 
the metamorphosed state and private businesses. In conclusion, this article 
attempts to evaluate the actual characteristics of Russian capitalism during 
Putin’s term, focusing on the state-business relationship. It also attempts to 
predict possible paths of future Russian capitalism in brief.
How to Explain Institutional Changes in Corporate 
Governance  
Existing Theories and Limits
1) Agency Cost Theory
The agency cost theory explains the evolution of corporate governance 
to the “Anglo-Saxon model” from a functionalist perspective of emphasizing 
economic efficiency. According to the agency cost theory, shareholders watch 
the businesses they have shares in to prevent or remedy management failure 
and to ensure dividend payouts to shareholders, which emerged as a crucial 
issue in reducing “transaction costs” (Jensen, 1986; 1987). According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), even efficiencyof resource allocation for a 
higher earnings rate could also be guaranteed by shareholder-oriented 
management.
The agency cost theory, however, regards shareholders as the sole 
rational actors in the process of change in corporate governance. It focuses 
only on the interaction between shareholders and professional management 
as the process of securing shareholders’ economic interests and efficiency, 
hence failing to consider the dynamics between shareholders and other actors 
or the political economic contexts in which relevant actors are embedded. 
Thus, it has already been pointed out that even U.S. corporate governance, 
which has served as the ideal model of the agency cost theory, has actually 
developed through specific historical and political factors. Efficiency here 
could only be obtained through the exceptional path taken by America 
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(Whitely, 1996; Roe, 2000). The supposition of shareholders as the atomized 
main actors is also valid only in the historical conditions of the U.S. where 
minority shareholders were widely distributed. In other words, the economic 
environment in the U.S. gradually met the prerequisites for the “Anglo-Saxon 
model” as tension between professional managers and minority shareholders 
reached a climax in supervising management.
When it comes to agency cost theory, there is a clear limit in attempting 
to explain the evolution of big Russian businesses toward the “Anglo-Saxon 
model.” As the agency cost theory only focuses on mutual tension between 
shareholders and professional management, exogenously regarding the 
former as “principals” and the latter as “agencies,” there is fundamental 
difficult in applying this theory to Russia because “majority shareholder-
managers” had already risen while all minority shareholders, employees and 
labor unions went down with the privatization process and the financial crisis 
in Russia in the 1990s (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995: 79; Lazareva, 
Rachinsky, and Stepanov, 2007: 25). 
2) Rent-Protection Theory
Under equal pressure on the demand for capital, owner-managers and 
professional managers are expected to show a difference in the way they 
depend on the capital market, wherein owner-managers will have lower 
preference towards outside shareholders. According to the rent-protection 
theory, when benefits of controlling private firms are greater to the initial 
owners, they attempt to maintain a lock on control (Bebchuk, 1999). Thus, if 
their voting block decreases or their status as controlling shareholders 
weakens, “majority shareholder-managers” would never sell their stakes 
which would subsequently lead to abandonment of the premium on their 
right of management. In addition, if existing owner-managers receive 
relatively large private benefits from dominating various subsidiaries via the 
majority shares in the parent holding, as it was in Russia, they have fewer 
incentives to adopt corporate governance which works in favor of other 
shareholders. The lock on control precisely corresponds to the owner-
managers’ economic interests. Particularly, under the lucrative macro- 
environment of big businesses promoted by Boris Yeltsin’s regime, Russian 
owner-managers could enjoy their status of controlling shareholder even 
through the fragility of corporate governance in the 1990s (Ickes, Murrell, 
and Ryterman, 1997).
If so, why did “majority shareholder-managers” in Russia make an IPO, 
change corporate governance to the “Anglo-Saxon model” and even sell a 
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significant part of their dominant stakes to others since 2003-04? The 
changes in legislation or code of practice can be explained easily as being part 
of Putin’s policies, while private owner-managers’ voluntary disclosure is 
more difficult to understand. A desperate financial need might motivate 
owner-managers to raise funds by going IPO or by selling their stakes to 
prominent outsiders to establish an industrial alliance. In order for this to 
happen, owner-managers have to initiate the corporate governance reform. 
Although going IPO would contribute to bringing in more capital, existing 
controlling shareholders might lose much of their right of management. 
Generally, this hypothesis cannot be persuasively applied to Russia’s case 
because big Russian businesses that maintain sub-holdings in the natural 
resources sectors seem to have considerable “retained earnings” since 2000, to 
the extent that they do not cry out to increase their equity capital. Although 
big businesses have sold part of their shares to pay off their debt for a while, 
their status can be regained before long. In particular, sharp rise in oil prices 
have provided enough “cash” to them without inducing burdensome outside 
owners. Furthermore, according to Leff (1978) and Chandler (1982), big 
businesses are able to transfer some financial assets into capital for business 
acts like expanding into other business sectors, investing in foreign markets 
and taking over related subsidiaries by making full use of “internal capital 
markets” through financial subsidiaries such as “pocket banks.” Russia’s big 
businesses have been under these self-same conditions in the 2000s. For 
instance, as presented in Alfa Bank’s annual report of 2003, TNK-BP 
expanded to Ukraine in 2003 and Alfa Telecom merged with Echo Telecom 
in 2004. These moves were made possible by “insider trading” of Alfa, the 
main “pocket bank” (Lee, 2007a: 144).
As for voluntary disclosure, another functionalist argument is based on 
future profitability. According to this argument, managers would not 
necessarily submit to pressures from minority shareholders by changing 
corporate governance. Since the 1990s, managers have often initiated 
transformation of corporate governance that would be profitable to all 
shareholders in order to raise productivity and bring about innovative 
technology under intensified competition in the global product market 
(Vitols, 2000: 6-7). This notion may be applied to explain several cases in 
Russia (i.e., the IT or telecommunications industry, etc.). Vimpelcom, for 
example, was the first firm in Russia to switch to the “Anglo-Saxon model” by 
entering the NYSE in 1995. It seems partly to have aimed at increasing equity 
capital, and subsequently making itself compete effectively in the global 
market. Hence, it is difficult to conclude that all big Russian businesses have 
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evolved toward the “Anglo-Saxon model” regardless of globalization. 
However, this changing trend in corporate governance among big private 
businesses, especially in the sectors of natural resources and energy that were 
not under the pressure of global competition, appeared infrequently until 
2003-04. Therefore, this explanation does not properly capture the process of 
change in corporate governance of Russia, either. 
Discursive Institutionalism and Political Hypothesis  
This article introduces an alternative explanation of an approach based 
on discursive institutionalism. Existing approaches on historical 
institutionalism regard a specific type of corporate governance (economic 
institution), polity (political institution) and policy as the outcome of history 
at a specific time and emphasize the tendency of institutional continuation, 
notwithstanding changes in its environment. Hence, contingency is 
emphasized; furthermore, the concept of “path-dependency” such as “critical 
junctures” or “feedback effects” is also more accentuated than it is in rational 
choice institutionalism. Sole emphasis on “critical junctures” or “feedback 
effects” is not only overly deterministic, but also makes it difficult to explain 
the dynamics of institutional change (Thelen, 1999: 396). Rather, Orren and 
Skowrenek (1994; 1996) understood that institutions reflect the construction 
of the heterogeneous factors, which consist of different processes and logics, 
respectively. Then, for polity or corporate governance to change, the most 
important aspect is how the relevant actors perceive future changes in their 
respective interests through the variations in the distribution of power among 
the groups involved in existing institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
The actor-centered institutionalism or discursive institutionalism 
focuses on the newly rising discourse or idea as an endogenous factor of 
change in each actor’s interest, the power relation among them and even the 
relevant institution itself, rather than existing new institutionalism (Blyth, 
2002; Schmidt, 2009). Although this theoretical view also recognizes the 
influence of material institutions on the actors’ choice such as the views of 
other institutionalism, discursive institutionalism emphasizes the discursive 
or ideational contexts as well. As for this, Schmidt (2009) recommends 
bringing the state back into comparative analysis of political economy. He 
also stresses that politics where the involved actors would compete through 
ideational as well as material foundations decisively influences changes in 
policy and polity. Competing discourses related to obtaining power of the 
state would have impact even on changes in an economic institution. During 
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the changes in specific institutions, collision among actors or coalitions who 
have different ideational and material foundations is inevitable, and in the 
process, a new dominant discourse will often have the actors behave on 
bounded rationality and make an unpredictable “path-breaking” institutional 
change. So the outcome of evolution can vary regardless of when until the 
political factors surrounding the institutions reach equilibrium. Also, 
competition among discourses is likely to be more violent and frequent in 
new democracies, as can be seen in Russia, than in other Western 
democracies.
Therefore, this article pays attention to several political factors such as 
Putin’s state bureaucracy and tax reform, which framed the “consolidation of 
vertical power” as an institutional context. In addition, this paper focuses on 
economic recovery and newly rising coherent elite groups within the political 
economic contexts that constructed statism. Due to these factors, the Russian 
state could be empowered in both ideational and material dimensions, and 
the power relations between the state and businesses also transformed 
significantly. In particular, property rights became disadvantageous to private 
businesses (Barnes, 2003: 175). Thus, this article argues that the Russian 
political factors allowed the state to obtain supremacy over private businesses 
since 2000. Also, changes in the interests and strategies of owner-managers 
who collided with the empowered state, which “attacked” and confiscated big 
private businesses under reversed power relations, consequently brought 
about changes in corporate governance toward the “Anglo-Saxon model.” 
Accordingly, it can be hypothesized that owner-managers often 
reinterpret the problem of corporate governance and spontaneously accept 
prominent foreign shareholders, though they are subject to supervision and 
constraint by outside owners. Under the hegemonic domination of statism 
and consequent asymmetrical power relations, these behaviors are deduced 
more causally by political incentives of owner-managers (i.e., protecting their 
properties even partially from the state and legitimating the status of normal 
billionaires) than by economic interests, because the external owner would 
increase the costs of which the offensive state must pay in the instance of 
customary threats to big businesses. In any case, to sell stakes to prominent 
multinational partners, a requirement for advanced corporate governance 
would be that all shareholders profit. Once various shareholder groups attain 
ownership, the result is that these “dealing shares” will strengthen the internal 
mechanism to monitor management and accelerate the transformation to the 
“Anglo-Saxon model” once again. 
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Putin’s Statism and Empowered State in Russia
Russian people have already been disappointed with the fragile 
democratic state, the quasi-neoliberal reform and the pro-West direction of 
Yeltsin’s regime amid the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s. 
Neoliberalism as a transitional test turned out to be a failure while only some 
oligarchs became wealthy in the distorted reform. In fact, despite excessively 
enormous resources of the Russian presidency based on the 1993 
constitution, Yeltsin could not afford to reform the state itself because of the 
tasks guided by IMF and the low approval ratings (Lee, 2009: 236-241).3 
However, the economic crisis and the incompetence and corruptions of 
Yeltsin’s regime made the actors, such as the people or electorates and 
particularly the elites, begin to feel the need to modify the neoliberal policy 
and reform the state. Thereafter, when the Chechen issue rose, Prime 
Minister Putin took the political chance to consolidate his image as a 
charismatic state rebuilder because he had the advantage of his incumbency 
over his competitor in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF), Gennady Zyuganov. A multitude of citizens found the right man for 
leading the state reform (Colton and McFaul, 2003: 180-182). As a result, the 
well-fought election in 1999 of the Unity (23.79%) and of Putin (53.44%) in 
2000 at last provided the opportunity for the new regime to have its own idea, 
statism.
State Bureaucracy and Tax Reform
Putin and his regime attempted to push through a comprehensive 
reform package named the “Gref Program” during the first term. Putin’s 
policy line particularly paid attention to the state bureaucratic reform because 
the state itself was perceived as a major impediment to reform achievement, 
according to the “Gref Program” (Aslund, 2004: 402-406). As the resistance of 
the societal actors could not be stronger in Putin’s term than Yeltsin’s, the 
president could set a reformist direction. Compared to the transitional period 
3 Moreover, Yeltsin did not exercise his vast institutional power because he could not take hold of 
the state bureaucracy, but rather, relied too much on decretismo and “family” as a political clan under 
the delegative presidentialism and clientele-oriented mechanism without democratic principles (see 
Breslauer, 1999). On the other hand, Putin rarely issued decrees but pushed on his policies by 
thoroughly controlling the bureaucracy. However, he was also never grounded on horizontal 
democratic procedures but on the superior executive procedures (Shevtsova, 2004).
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of the 1990s, the reform evidently must have contributed to improving the 
efficiency of governance somewhat (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004). However, it 
is still difficult to say that the bureaucratic capacity was completely achieved 
in Russia. Corruption of political figures and lower bureaucrats still spread, 
and government restructuring continues to be distorted to the present 
(Gaman-Golutvina, 2008: 41). 
Rather, the state bureaucracy reform influenced other aspects related to 
the metamorphosis of polity. Above all, it is notable that Putin sought to 
simplify state bureaucracy, while the agencies of the executive branch under 
the direct control of the presidency increased as part of the reform running 
parallel with the foundation of the 7 “federal districts.” Thus, much of the 
political decision-making processes were concentrated on a few ministries, 
posts and especially the Kremlin. The centralization not only eradicated the 
constitutional veto players, but also formulated the “consolidation of vertical 
power” of the state, which allowed the “core” power organs of the executive, 
particularly the security agencies, to ensure that directions from the top 
would be implemented and obeyed (Shevtsova, 2005: 233-234; Yakovlev, 
2006: 1041-1048).4 It became difficult for the officers of other state 
institutions, including the regional governments, Duma and the judiciary 
branch, and even social organizations and the press to supervise the political 
“core.”5 Although a power struggle among the “core” or departmentalism 
might often come about, they could not help being subordinate to the 
Imperial President in the end. In short, the reform strengthened the 
autonomy and enforceability of the state bureaucracy which Putin controlled 
at the top, but it was neither able to rationalize individual bureaucrats nor set 
the “rule of law.”
Among Putin’s reforms during his first term, the tax reform deserves the 
greatest attention, because it simultaneously represented the direction toward 
4 The effect could be maximized with the appointment of new elite groups into key posts in the 
power organs, e.g., Presidential Administration, Security Council, Procurator General’s Office, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) in the later part of Putin’s 
first term. Until then, “consolidation of vertical power” was a mere institutional frame and 
incomplete to work without a hitch because discursive statism could not yet dominate Russian 
politics. As for this, see the following parts of this section. As pointed out, even the presidency of the 
period also had quite strong institutional foundations, though Yeltsin’s leadership based solely on the 
“family” could not control the bureaucracy under the condition of divided government. For 
instance, the periodical conflicts between Yeltsin and Procurator Generals or Prime Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov in Yeltsin’s term are well-known.
5 In addition, the “core” maintained even the off-budget slash fund, respectively, according to 
Holmes (2006: 306).
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a liberal market economy and empowered state. The tax system used to be 
recognized as one of the most important indicators of a capable state. In 
Russia, groups in the federal government that supported the market, some 
liberals, corporate collaborators in the Duma, and big businesses (especially 
those in the oil sector), all agreed on a tax reform blitz in 2001. The reform 
package significantly lowered the rates of both corporate tax (from 35% to 
24%) and personal tax (introduced a 13% flat rate), simplified the code and 
eliminated many existing tax privileges.
In regards to the tax reform, a more important point is that Putin would 
have overcome the organizational constraints on the tax bureau to improve 
collection. The tax authority had already set a regular bargaining system to 
cope with tax arrears. The right to deal with state debts, which had been 
divided among four separate departments, became concentrated into a single 
department (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 5, 2001). In the reform process, 
moreover, Putin had the independent tax authority be subject to the Federal 
Tax Service (FTS) under the Ministry of Finance, reduced the number of 
federal agencies, and in particular, placed tax polices in the MVD for 
centralization (Easter, 2006; 40-44). 
These attempts might suggest in part that the tax administration should 
be more thorough in collecting all kinds of tax. It cannot be denied that there 
was some advancement in the ability to collect tax revenues. Nonetheless, the 
revised tax collection system still focused on target-driven collection rather 
than general compliance of the imposed (Berenson, 2008: 146-147). Given 
that tax auditors could assign the target amount or adjust the amount of bill 
or arrears discretionally without being monitored, and tax police and even 
tax authority became more subordinate to the “core,” the President was given 
more opportunities to abuse the taxation system. In terms of the 
administrative aspect of institutional resource, therefore, tax reform also 
contributed more obviously toward establishing statism rather than 
improving the state capacity on the Weberian scale.
 
Economic Recovery
In Russia, despite the fact that balance of trade and federal government’s 
budget surplus continued from 1999-2000, almost al l the main 
macroeconomic indicators began to turn for the better toward the end of 
Putin’s first term, i.e., both the percentage of GDP growth and “industrial 
production growth” exceeded 7% and “fixed capital investment growth” went 
above 10% for the first time in 2003. Also, “the growth rate of export” 
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indicated a 25% rise and “current account” was in excess of $60 billion. As a 
result, “foreign currency reserves” jumped above $120 billion in 2004 (World 
Bank, 2004; 2006). Furthermore, state-controlled energy firms added “oil 
money” to the national finance.
The rapid economic recovery not only strengthened Russian state in the 
side of material capacities but also brought in the more important political 
advantages. Above all things, economic recovery could most directly bring 
about a rise in public support for Putin (Way, 2005: 258-259). Needless to say, 
the main factor of an economic recovery was the drastic rise in the price of 
natural resources. The world oil price had risen to around $100 a barrel as 
compared to $10 per barrel at its lowest in 1998. Natural gas and metal prices 
also rose as much as that of oil. Due to such an unpredicted turn of fortuitous 
events during Putin’s term, the majority of the people thought that their new 
regime was performing very well regardless of the actual success or failure in 
its reform, including the state bureaucracy and tax reforms. This led them to 
uphold Putin’s policy passionately at the end of his first term and the 
beginning of the second, though they had to give up a part of their democratic 
rights (Hiro, 2007). 
Putin did not need to become a populist who wastes “cash” because of 
his high popularity. Unlike the state of the Yeltsin period, consequently, 
Putin’s state had no incentives to provide special rents to the oligarchs. The 
regime had no more need for dealing with the fiscal deficit in the short-run at 
the expense of unfair sale of valuable state assets or long and short-term state 
treasury bonds (GKO) to big private businesses at a discounted price, because 
it did not have to be attached to the balance of the national finances.6 In fact, 
Held’s so-called “strategies of displacement” (1987: 240-241) which satisfies 
the groups that can effectively request and mobilize the opposition against 
the state at huge costs to the majority of the people had been taken for 
immediate “cash” by the Yeltsin regime. However, Putin’s state already had 
ample income, and further, the regime could even secure the corrupt but 
abundant political funds from the monopolistic state-controlled businesses, 
e.g., Gazprom (Weinthal and Jones Luong, 2006: 237).
Favorable economic conditions enhanced Putin’s popularity and led to 
subsequent victories in the parliamentary election in 2003 and the 
presidential election in 2004. Therefore, Putin’s regime did not have to 
degenerate into a disabled populist regime which gives direct grants and 
6 See Lee (2009) for causality among cozy dealings between the regime and big businesses, Yeltsin’s 
clientele-oriented populism and the chronic deficit of national finance.
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subsidies to the populace. The regime could now reinforce the direction of 
statism, unlike its predecessor. On the other hand, the oligarchs were 
gradually losing resources to sustain their political status. After all, the factor 
of economic recovery contributed to legitimating statism along the fiscal 
health, thus allowing Putin’s regime to achieve overwhelming superiority 
over private businesses.
Newly Rising Elite Groups
The landslide victory of the ruling party, United Russia, acquiring an 
absolute majority (300 out of 447) in 2003 and the same of Putin (71.31%) in 
2004, maintaining overwhelming support for Putin’s regime and unparalleled 
economic recovery all together gave the reelected president larger space to 
pursue his own line.7 Moreover, as Putin distanced himself from Yeltsin’s 
“family” and brought in new elites to head the posts of the political “core” of 
the bureaucratic authoritarian polity at the time,8 the regime could complete 
“consolidation of vertical power” beyond the level of institutional 
configuration by adopting and promulgating the statist ideology of new elite 
groups.
Among the new elite groups, the “siloviki” and the “technocrats” in 
particular, the former group originated from the military and security offices 
of the Soviet era, i.e., the KGB, army, prosecution, police and so on, who 
seem to have significantly influenced the construction of the statist idea of 
Putin’s regime. Clearly anti-West, the “siloviki” had criticized Yeltsin’s 
socioeconomic and diplomatic lines. They asserted that the state not only 
intervene in the market for national interests, but also attempt to regain the 
position of a great power in international politics by, for instance, utilizing 
abundant natural resources as diplomatic leverage.9 At last, by a salient 
ideologue of the regime, Surkov (2009), the ideas were conceptualized toward 
the “Sovereign Democracy” and even validated as the unique Russian way of 
democracy. Then the “siloviki” attempted to inspire the entire society with 
7 Of course, it was guessed there were widespread illegal interventions of the regime in the 
elections (Fish, 2005).
8 According to Way (2005), one of the most remarkable distinctions between the two presidents 
was that Yeltsin could not maintain solid elite organizations except for the fragmentary nepotistic 
clans while Putin was able to do so.
9 But, of course, all of the Putin regime’s policy could not be said to be only made and enforced by 
the statist idea. Rather, discursive statism would work more as part of an ideational resource for the 
elite groups than as a macro-cultural determinant of overall policy outcome.
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sovereignty, patriotism, nationalism and statism, and because of these tactics, 
the group was suspected by the West of pursuing authoritarianism 
(Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2003; Baev, 2004; Shevtsova, 2004; Bremmer 
and Charap, 2007-08). 
The idea for such a policy was also represented in Putin’s thesis, which is 
understood by Olcott (2004: 3) as follows: “whereas Putin recognizes the 
importance of market forces and the need to protect private property, but he 
believes that both must be managed to insure that neither takes precedence 
over the interests of state, which exercises its control in the name of Russian 
people.” The statist idea proposed by Putin and the hegemonic elite group 
were being supported more and more by the Russian people, and some state-
controlled media have diffused the discursive agenda as well. Even a few 
major oppositions, e.g., CPRF and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR), followed his statism.
Another elite group from St. Petersburg, the “technocrats,” also seemed 
to support the role of the state in leading the nation’s economic development, 
but have relatively less faith in patriotism or nationalism compared to the 
“siloviki.”10 At the same time, this group was distinguished from the more 
traditional “liberals,” i.e., German Gref and Alexei Kudrin. However, 
according to Shevtsova (2005: 235), even the difference between the “siloviki” 
and the “liberals” would not amount much in their focus on the state’s role 
beyond the neoliberal regulatory state, though other elite groups have 
supported a more liberal market than the “siloviki.” Hence, the “technocrats” 
also seem to have a similar statist idea regarding the role of the state, which 
should intervene in the economy at least partially (Balzer, 2005; Bremmer 
and Charap, 2007-08).            
10 But it is hard to say that the role of Russia’s state constitutes the developmental state in which a 
relatively authoritarian regime should intervene in economic matters, even going so far as distorting 
the signal of market prices for late industrialization. According to Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), 
Wade (1990) and Evans (1995) et al., the developmental state has various strategic institutions or 
“embedded autonomy” to connect itself with businesses and to resolve problems with collective 
action, including capable bureaucracy, administrative guidance, political finance and subsidy and so 
on. In addition, Russian capitalism also lacked the specific coordination mechanisms of the 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) which have been conceptualized by Hall and Soskice (2001) 
et al. The author has already discussed this issue in another paper in which it is stated that the state-
big business relation during Putin’s term was merely an unstable coexistence of political 
authoritarianism and economic capitalism without any institutional complementarity for economic 
development, and Putin’s state was still closer to a pro-capital state such as a developmental rather 
than a pro-labor state (Lee, 2007b: 381-383). Indeed, the relation is still different from that of the 
proactive developmental state or other CMEs. Although Russia’s state may evolve into a 
developmental state, such a possibility seems to be very low at the moment.
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In sum, the rising of new elite groups led to establishing the policy idea 
of Putin’s regime beyond the change in polity. Namely, the state completed 
the substantial functioning of “consolidation of vertical power” by spreading 
the dominant discourse on statism in the aspects of the ideational foundation 
along with economic recovery. 
Political Dynamics of the Evolution of Private Corporate 
Governance
State’s “Attack”: Reversed Power Relation between the State and Big Businesses
The failure of Yeltsin’s regime produced a new idea for the revival of the 
state to prevail in Russia as a social reaction. Hence, Putin’s new regime 
shaped the “consolidation of vertical power” as an institutional frame for 
statism through a series of state reforms. In the political economic context, 
moreover, sharp economic recovery and Putin’s popularity laid down the 
cornerstone for constructing the statist discourse and the rise of new elite 
groups, which decisively led to the domination of statism at the beginning of 
Putin’s second term. 
“Consolidation of vertical power” had the consequence of concentrating 
almost all essential power on the “core” of the state, e.g., the Kremlin, a few 
powerful bureaucratic organs of the federal executive branch and new elite 
groups under the immediate control of the Russian president. In line with the 
rise of statism, furthermore, the tripartite system for the separation of power 
was restricted as even the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
became more subordinate to the “core” and the President. After all, Russia’s 
state closed the transitional defects both materially and ideationally, and this 
political condition helped to delegate vast power to Putin. In contrast, big 
businesses were deprived of their resources and discourses in justifying their 
overstated status, due to their notorious illegal dealings in the 1990s. The 
failure of the transitional period was mostly blamed on them. Although some 
entrepreneurs competitively entered into the legislative branch to obtain 
political influence, the new political “core” was already overwhelming the 
Duma. As a result, property rights of private businesses were weakened 
tremendously. 
It is worth mentioning that the current political economic context is still 
strongly influenced by the unique historical legacies related to property rights 
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from the Czarist and Soviet era to the Yeltsin era.11 In Russia, property rights 
have not developed as they have in the West, where the bourgeois culture and 
various institutions of market capitalism have formed historically over many 
centuries (Cohen, 2000: 48; Pipes, 2005: 1-26). Russia had been under 
Communist rule for 70 years, and hence, was unable to build trustable social 
organizations. Moreover, given the judicature’s inability to constrain the 
various state agents including federal and regional governments, property 
rights have been threatened by state factors as well as societal factors (Huskey, 
1992: 224-231; Frye, 2004: 454-458).
Under the hegemonic presence of statism, the contextual tendency 
related to property rights became stronger but more favorable to the state as 
the concept of property rights was reperceived by the actors involved during 
Putin’s term. The “core” of the state could interfere with businesses arbitrarily 
through the support of the judicature. Even the courts would give preferential 
treatment to the state in conflicts between the state and businesses, and tax 
bureaucracy could also be used by the “core” as a tool. The only concern of 
big businesses was to cut down the tax rate, but they might not have 
predicted the other effects of the tax authority which was no longer 
independent. After the middle of the first term, if the tax bureaucrats were 
pressured strongly by a specific elite group, they would apply tax arrears to 
big private businesses that are in profitable industries or are useful for various 
political goals as a mean of coercing them to nationalize or become state-
controlled firms (Kryshtanovskaya, 2002). As the need to sell public 
enterprises to private capital at very low prices decreased because of the 
consistent balance of national finance, the state could metamorphose from a 
captured seller into a greedy M&A raider. The ministries and businesses who 
had failed in asset competitions in the 1990s, particularly those firms directly 
controlled by the Kremlin such as Gazprom, siloviki-controlled ministries 
such as FSB, and firms supported by an influential elite faction such as 
Rosneft, gained new opportunities in the reversed power relation between 
the state and private businesses (Tompson, 2005: 191). As a result, the newly 
rising “core” elites strengthened the loyalty to the regime, responding not 
only to ideational incentives but also to the selective economic rents as 
11 There have been two dominant arguments concerning which factors serve to promote securing 
property rights. One emphasizes the importance of societal factors such as civic participation or 
social capital. For more detailed explanation of “social capital,” see Putnam (1993). The other focuses 
on various characteristics of the state such as whether it is conceivable that the arbitrary use of power 
by the bureaucrats or elected officials on behalf of the dominant group can attenuate property rights. 
See North (1981) and Frye and Shleifer (1997).
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material compensations.
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) was, in fact, 
organized to reflect the aggregated interests of businesses on a strategy of 
corporatism, and oligarchs also began participating in it in 2000 (Hanson and 
Teague, 2005: 661). However, even though the members of this business 
leaders’ group requested that the state impose some restraints on the zeal of 
the tax offices and so forth in 2005, Putin ignored such requests. It was said 
that RUIE had been controlled by the Kremlin and that Putin recently 
became averse to the organization as a new fort of corrupt owner-managers 
(Markus, 2007: 289). If even RUIE was not permitted to provide its opinion 
to the regime, the life and death of businesses would have to be dependent 
upon the discretionary power of the state backed by statism. Particularly, the 
energy sectors, which is useful for both domestic politics and diplomatic 
leverage, cannot help being vulnerable to the appetite of the state. As the state 
obtained the power to take over any assets, even businesses with solid ties to 
the regime might be “attacked” at any time.
The new political dynamics reflected by the rise of statism has already 
appeared at the beginning of the regime in the cases of Boris Berezovsky’s 
ORT and Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTV. At the end of the first term, however, the 
Yukos affair rather explicitly revealed the extremely reversed state-big 
business relationship where Putin and the Kremlin were more directly 
involved. This affair demonstrated certain changes in the interactions among 
the involved actors in all aspects including the causes, processes, results, and 
so on.12 Owner-manager Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was distinctively 
hostile to Putin and his policies and gave hints of his naked desire to seize 
political power, was finally arrested and his oil group dismembered. 
The prosecution, tax administration and the judiciary that became more 
subordinate to the Kremlin played an important role in the process of this 
affair (Easter, 2006: 46; Fortescue, 2006: 157-168). In the first place, the 
prosecutor’s office had not only scrupulously investigated Khodorkovsky and 
Platon Lebedev’s illegal acquisition of shares beforehand, it also instructed the 
tax authority to enforce the law concerning Yukos. Although the tax 
bureaucracy could not have reviewed a signed-off audit which had been 
intended to give businesses some sense of security beforehand, the authority 
purposely questioned the work of the lower offices and totally denied the 
12 For more detailed facts about the dismantling of Yukos, see Hanson and Teague (2005: 677-
680), Tompson (2005: 192-194), Weinthal and Jones Luong (2006: 244-246), and Fortescue (2006: 
121-148).
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legality of original tax to Yukos. This reopening clearly seemed to disrupt 
Putin’s principle “rule of law” but also brought about the new “rule by law,” as 
Remington (2004: 228) describes. Even the Constitutional Court rendered 
judgment in absolute favor of the state in regard to the issue, which had a big 
impact on businesses (Vedomosti, February 27, 2004). This meant that if the 
Kremlin intends it, the state would always be able to hassle businesses de facto 
more lawfully than ever before.
Above all, Putin’s will could be planned and even be implemented 
because not only did the majority of the Russians support the attitude of the 
regime, they were also sure of Khodorkovsky’s guilt. A popular opinion in 
Russia was also that the privatization of the 1990s had been not fair at all and 
the criminal oligarchs should be punished even in the 2000s (Ria Novosti, 
June 1, 2005; Markus, 2007: 303). Then, the main axis of social cleavages in 
Russian politics transferred from whether Soviet or not to whether state or 
capitalists. In addition, as explained, Russian people already came to prefer 
the intervention of the state to resolve economic problems after 2000 
(Whitefield, 2005: 144). The “consolidation of vertical power” could actually 
function to serve Putin’s will, and even the state’s “attack” could be politically 
justified because the statist discourse, the presence of leading elite groups and 
people’s consistent support were firmly based as the ideational resources for 
the regime.
The Kremlin itself had to make the final decision in dismantling Yukos. 
Interestingly, after its dismantlement, Gazprom led by the “technocrats” 
(Aleksei Miller and Dmitry Medvedev) and Rosneft led by the “siloviki” (Igor 
Sechin) competed vigorously to merge its main production company, 
Yuganskneftegaz. This conflict disclosed some differences in the ideological, 
political and economic interests of each elite group under the same regime 
(Lee, 2007b: 374-378). Nonetheless, no matter who took over the assets, it 
would inevitably be absorbed into the state-controlled firm under the 
mediation of Putin at the top. In short, the influential political “core” backed 
up by the various state agencies as well as the new dominant discourse on 
statism created a severely threatening environment to the security of the 
owner-managers’ assets and survival.
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Owner-Manager’s Choice to “Exit”13: The “Anglo-Saxon Model” 
Under the disappearance of the macroeconomic conditions suitable for 
financial speculation and the corrupt rents given during Yeltsin’s term, it 
became more difficult for the owner-managers to increase assets because of 
the political risks incurred by the state.14 In addition, the oligarchs could not 
defend their legitimacy and overcome the “attack” of the empowered state 
despite their desperate declaration that the substantially weakened discourse 
on liberal market economy or democracy of the 1990s should run counter to 
statism (Kagarlitsky, 2004). As described, prominent private media groups, 
which would have supported big private businesses, had already been 
absorbed into the state at the beginning of the regime. Thus, the incentive 
and strategy mechanisms of the “majority shareholder-managers” were 
revised completely from speculative and corrupt accumulation of wealth into 
protection of their properties and political survival, but there seemed to 
remain few exceptions where private owner-managers could defend 
themselves against pressure from the state. 
However, some cases proved that inducing external shareholders into 
ownership as an “exit” strategy through the strategic sale of stakes or listing of 
substantial shares could effectively guarantee the security of big businesses. 
To sell stakes to potential investors, of course, the requirement for the “Anglo-
Saxon model,” which would be profitable to all the shareholders, should be 
met. Fortunately, the rise of natural resources and economic growth 
throughout the world, and even the stable foreign exchange rate, gave 
additional incentives to foreign capital to invest in Russia. The dispersed 
owners — foreign external shareholders or minority shareholders — and 
among them, the prominent multinational investors directly backed by their 
home governments seemed to be most effective, even though the Russian 
entrepreneurs had a loathing for foreign capital since privatization. Foreign 
governments were able to get Russia’s courts and the state itself to pay the 
sharply rising costs for interfering with private businesses through a lawsuit 
or through raising diplomatic issues against Russia (Markus, 2008: 86-93). 
13 The “exit” would mean one of the strategies of the capital side for governing their properties, a 
concept used by Hirschman for the first time. See Hirschman (1978). 
14 According to Han (2004), the increasing asset specificity of big businesses from financial to 
industrial capital after the 1998 crisis mainly contributed to strengthening the state capacity. This 
analysis also seems to be partly meaningful. However, as explained, state capacity rarely improved, 
and even the state power against society could more decisively be fortified due to Putin’s statism.
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For example, although Vimpelcom was already listed on the NYSE in 
1995, this attempt to go IPO had an unpredicted political effect in 2003-04. In 
August 2003, Alfa Group bought a blocking stake in Megafon, which had 
been affiliated with a company named Telecominvest until then. 
Telecominvest had been supported by the regime and a political clan from St. 
Petersburg. When the FTS finally presented Vimpelcom with a bill for $157 
million in back taxes, the parent holding, Alfa Group, resisted Leonid Reiman 
who was then the minister of communications and had power behind 
Telecominvest. Interestingly, this fight proceeded very differently from other 
clashes between the state and big businesses. Telenor, a Norwegian phone 
company whose share of 54% was owned by the Norwegian government, had 
maintained 30% of the shares in Vimpelcom, Telenor’s interests were directly 
connected to the future of Vimpelcom. Unlike other conflicts, Vimpelcom 
could shake off the state’s grip with the direct help of Norway’s Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg instead of Alfa, and ultimately, this multinational 
investor finally made the Kremlin give up threatening Vimpelcom altogether 
(Arvedlund, 2005). However, Telenor worked furiously against Vimpelcom’s 
expansion into the Ukraine in 2005 because of the uncertainty of obtaining 
future profits. This demonstrated that substantial risks may follow when the 
“majority shareholder-manager” gives up the right of management. Thus, it 
proved that an owner-manager would not necessarily dispose of a substantial 
stake for economic interests only, but rather, often do that in order to protect 
their assets and to survive.
Whereas Vimpelcom fought a feud with just one faction of the state, 
more serious tension between the Kremlin and big businesses in the energy 
sector was disclosed in the case of TNK-BP in 2005. In 1999, prior to this 
occurrence, TNK had attempted to usurp the control over a subsidiary of 
Sidanko, but British Petroleum (BP), which owned 10% of the shares in 
Sidanko and occupied almost all the seats of its “board of directors” at the 
time, defeated the hostile M&A tryout with the help of the U.S. government 
and defendedits interests from TNK (Goldman, 2003: 145-146). Ironically, in 
2003, Alfa and its partner, Renova, sold one-half of their stakes in TNK to BP, 
resulting in a new international oil giant, TNK-BP. According to the annual 
reports issued after the merger, the corporate governance of the firm clearly 
moved toward the “Anglo-Saxon model.” Also, BP-appointed directors 
occupied more than half of the seats on the board, and it is inferred that the 
owner-manager of TNK, Mikhail Fridman, had realized the political effects 
of a prominent external shareholder entering into the owner group from the 
Sidanko incident. This choice made by Alfa differentiated itself decisively 
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from that of Yukos. As it had been with Yukos, a back-tax claim of $1 billion 
was levied on TNK-BP by the tax administration in 2005. BP’s CEO John 
Brown, however, met Putin and other top politicians, and as a result of these 
visits, BP was able to reduce the bill to about one-quarter of the originally 
imposed amount. BP then had to appease the Kremlinby bringing up the 
subject of potential investments in Russia (Russia Journal, September 5, 
2005).
It is reasonable to question why Yukos was unable to overcome an 
“attack” from the state despite switching its corporate governance toward the 
“Anglo-Saxon model.” The case of Yukos can be distinguished from that of 
TNK on two points. Firstly, Yukos had protected the interests of its minority 
shareholders but had not been able to ally itself with its prominent external 
shareholders such as BP, i.e., dispersed ownership might not have been 
sufficient to guarantee property rights. Just before it was dissolved, Yukos 
attempted to attract strategic investments from either Exxon-Mobile or 
ChevronTexaco. It is surmised that Putin and the “siloviki” would desperately 
resist that move. After all, Yukos was dissolved because it had attempted to 
draw foreign capital, and at the same time, it failed to do so. Secondly, the 
political behavior of Khodorkovsky, owner-manager of Yukos, had angered 
Putin and his elite groups by overtly giving donations to a number of non-
government parties, some individual deputies in the Duma and, even more, 
to social organizations (Jack, 2004: 211).
On the other hand, another “exit” strategy of Roman Abramovich went 
beyond the issue of just changing corporate governance when he had been 
the “majority shareholder-manager” of Sibneft, which had already published 
figures calculated in accordance with the U.S. GAAP even before the 1998 
financial crisis. It also became the first energy firm to appoint independent 
directors. In addition, it boosted dividend payments to three-quarters of its 
net profit in 2001 (Heinrich, 2005: 5). Yet Abramovich suddenly decided to 
sell this valuable asset to Gazprom in 2005. The undervalued price of the 
right of management roused many questions as to whether the oligarch 
might have been forced to give up Sibneft. However, Christopher Weafer at 
Alfa Bank said, “It’s difficult to say now that he had a gun to his head.” In fact, 
Abramovich had already given up his other Russian assets step by step, i.e., 
Russian Aluminum and Aeroflot, as well (Kramer, 2005).
Abramovich’s choice evidently collided head on with the rent-protection 
theory. In particular, an owner-manager abandoning the oil major when oil 
prices were still rising sharply cannot easily be understood. In addition, 
whereas market capitalization of Sibneft was approximately $14 billion, the 
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net income of this company reached as much as $6 billion in 2004 (Sibneft, 
2004: 9-10). Thus, it is still difficult to explain the initial owner’s decision to 
sell all his shares in the firm which had infinite potential to grow based on 
the approach of economic interests. Even if Abramovich was satisfied with 
being just one of the world’s billionaires who desires only a luxurious life and 
to belong to the prestigious English soccer club Chelsea in which many 
superstar play, there still remain doubts about his sale of Sibneft. There is a 
great possibility that he decided to protect his property at least partially, 
before he lost all of it. Maybe Abramovich decided that the private business 
side could never reverse the power relation again, and in that case, he might 
align himself with the hegemonic statist discourse despite the fact that quite a 
few owner-managers still seem to resist the state by reforming their corporate 
governance system.
Unlike the U.S., minority shareholders did not initiate the reform of 
corporate governance in Russia. Rather, owners who had more than a 
blocking stake voluntarily attempted to switch to the “Anglo-Saxon model” to 
“exit” from the greedy state, which is contrary to various economic theories. 
To achieve their goals, the “oligarchs” actually had to pay more attention to 
the voice of external shareholders, increase the number of independent 
directors and improve the transparency of financial management. These 
changes were neither functionalistic nor “path-dependent.” In other words, 
Putin’s regime had all the power through institutional “consolidation of 
vertical power” and ideational statism, and consequently, the empowered 
state motivated “majority shareholder-managers” to “exit” from the range of 
the state’s influence. Notwithstanding that these owner-managers would lose 
part of their rights of management or even run counter to their calculated 
short-term economic interests, they reinterpreted the problem of corporate 
governance and opted for the influential external shareholders to increase the 
cost that the state had to pay for intervening arbitrarily in businesses. The 
existence of prominent external shareholders itself could protect the assets of 
big private businesses and partially legitimize their political statuses. This 
political dynamic might cause a “path-breaking” evolution, termed discursive 
institutionalism, of private corporate governance in Russia, at least in the oil 
and gas sectors the state prefers to take over. Corporate governance in other 
sectors also seems to have accepted institutional isomorphism. Paradoxically, 
the “Anglo-Saxon model” of some big businesses emerged in Russia where 
neoliberalism failed but statism rose anew.
By 2006, however, the state had already controlled approximately 30% of 
the oil sector and sustained a monopoly over almost all of the gas through 
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Gazprom (Orttung, 2006: 2). In addition, the state had leverage over big 
private businesses in the oil and gas sectors through Transneft which controls 
the pipeline monopoly has prevented big private businesses from resolving 
collective action dilemma (Gorst, 2004). In short, it can be said that the large 
state-controlled business spheres, particularly concentrated in the energy 
sector, and big private businesses, which have managed to evolve toward the 
“Anglo-Saxon model,” coexist unstably in Russian capitalism today.
Conclusion
State-controlled businesses and big private businesses are competing 
against each other in Russian capitalism today. It is difficult to predict how 
the characteristics of Russian capitalism will change during Medvedev’s term 
in office, but this turbulence still continues to date. For example, government 
environmental inspector Oleg Mitvol said, “violations, whether they are 
committed by foreign or Russian companies, should be punished in the same 
way under the laws of the Russian Federation.” Hence an issue was raised out 
of TNK-BP’s violation of environmental regulations in Sakhalin in November 
2006 (Elder, 2006). Although Mitvol denied any other political intentions, the 
state seems to clarify the state’s intention to not tolerate any businesses that go 
against the state. 
If the characteristics of Russia’s state in Medvedev’s term are similar to 
those of Putin’s, a predicting that Russian capitalism will follow one of two 
paths is possible. The first is that the state itself will have both capability and 
autonomy over businesses, while its discretionary power is checked partly by 
democratic principles. Thus, in this model, the state would guide the 
businesses into making economic development by its selective industrial 
policy, guidelines in R&D, etc. in the case of the East Asian developmental 
states (Evans, 1995). In addition, the weakened labor force might regain some 
influence, which would result in the state contributing to long-term 
economic growth under political stability. However, there is little possibility 
of realizing this scenario due to the fragility of democracy in Russia and the 
lack of bureaucratic capacity. 
There is another possibility — the authoritarian regime may increase the 
scale of state-controlled sectors and suppress private businesses more and 
more (Holmes, 2006). As Abramovich’s strategic choice implies, Russian 
capitalism can evolve toward patrimonial state capitalism that is operated 
inefficiently, if the state-controlled sectors expand through “attack,” for the 
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time being without developing coordination mechanisms. In this case, each 
political “core” of the state might pursue its own interests and rent-seeking in 
the natural resource sectors. Furthermore, the state could use them as a tool 
to take a new position in the global stage. The larger the state-controlled 
business is, the greater the possibility to distort the market coordination. 
Although public enterprises must not be assessed just from the viewpoint of 
economic efficiency, excessive scale of them would obstruct market forces on 
long-term economic growth. Also, such a tendency may run parallel to 
deepening authoritarianism.
On the other hand, the state would not be able to bear the increasing 
cost of getting involved in big businesses if the latter attempt to “exit” 
consistently through conversion to the “Anglo-Saxon model.” Although the 
requisites for Anglo-Saxon capitalism, i.e., the infrastructures for flexible 
capital and labor market, consolidation of property rights, re-regulation and 
so on, are still insufficient, prominent and influential foreign shareholders 
who have been welcomed as reliable allies would force the oligarchs to reform 
their corporate governance and, by extension, lead to changes in the model of 
Russian capitalism to be in line with the era of globalization. Even changing 
to this model, however, does not necessarily mean that Russian capitalism 
will match political and economic democracy. Although many businesses 
that meet the requisites for the “Anglo-Saxon model” may participate in the 
Russian market, the issue of inequality will still remain due to the 
fundamental limits of the Anglo-Saxon market capitalism (The Economist, 
June 17, 2006). In any case, the state-controlled areas are not yet small, and 
the discourse on statism is still dominant in Russia. 
The state and big businesses in Russia fight vigorously against each other 
to build the path of Russian capitalism and to obtain each of their own 
political and economic interests. The state still seemed to be stronger than big 
businesses until recently, but the latter’s resistance against the former through 
the latter’s “exit” strategy cannot be ignored. More attention must be given to 
whether the unstable coexistence between the state and big private businesses 
under Putin’s regime will continue or not during the term of office of 
Medvedev, who has a rather more liberal mind than Putin.
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